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CBA: Much, much better than expected

Normally the semi-annual profit results from the Commonwealth Bank are fairly staid affairs, with the bank delivering consistent profits with few surprises. However, this reporting season the CBA result will face a far greater degree of scrutiny after the annus horribilis of 2018.

In this period, the bank has faced 9 challenges:

1) Royal Commission

2) CEO resignation

3) CFO resignation

4) Settlement with AUSTRAC for $700 million

5) Demerging Colonial Wealth Management

6) APRA Inquiry

7) Sale of life insurance business,

8) settlement of interest-rate rigging case with ASIC and

9) A weak 3rd quarter update in May.

When companies confront the range of issues that CBA has faced over the past 12 months, new management teams often have the opportunity to rebase earnings downwards, thus giving themselves easier hurdles to jump over in the future.

The market was quite pessimistic on CBA going into this result and so has been surprised at the +3.7% increase in cash profits and that the dividend was slightly increased.

The 2018 result also showed that the bank had increased their net interest margin [(Interest Received – Interest Paid) divided by Average Invested Assets] from 2.1% to 2.15%. Whilst this does not sound like much, small changes in this margin are beneficial when applied to an asset base of $975 billion.

The expansion in this margin shows that over the past year CBA has been successful in both raising prices on their loans and reducing the interest rates paid to those that lend the bank money such as depositors.

A significant feature in the profit growth that the major Australian banks have enjoyed over the past five years has been declining bad debt charges. Consequently, one of the key financial indicators to look at is a banks’ bad debt charge, as a rise in this charge is likely to indicate the start of a cycle of rising bad debts as these charges normalise to a long-term average of around 0.3% of gross loans. This result showed that CBA’s impairment charge actually fell further to 0.13% over the past six months.

Result was better than we expected

2018 has been a tough year for investors in bank stocks and in particular for CBA shareholders. The prevailing narrative has been a negative one dominated by concerns about the Royal Commission, house prices and exciting fintech companies displacing the banks.

We added to the CBA weight during the Royal Commission and going into the result, as we saw that the market price discounted both the resilience of the CBA’s key profit centre retail banking services and management’s ability to respond to the changing environment.

Our positive investment view towards Australia’s premier retail bank has not changed, though in fairness this result was better than we expected.

What the market was underestimating

Going into this result the market has been overlooking CBA’s ability to pull various levers to maintain profits in response to changing market conditions.

Going into this result the market was expecting contractions in the bank’s net interest margin, due to rising funding costs as measured by the BBSW (bank bill swap rate) and the impact of 2017’s big bank levy.

The below table shows the levers pulled by management to maintain profits, namely raising rates on loans and controlling the rates that the bank pays for retail deposits.

This post originally appeared in Livewire

Big versus Small Company Investing

Over the past twelve months, small companies (as measured by the ASX’s Small Ordinaries) have returned 22%, outperforming large caps (ASX Top 100) by almost 10%. This has led to numerous articles in the financial press claiming that small is beautiful and that investors should look beyond large Australian companies to add growth and excitement to their portfolios.

In this week’s piece, we are going to look at the reasons behind this performance discrepancy on the ASX, and why investors tend to get compensated for investing in small capitalisation companies.

Large capitalisation companies are defined as those in the Top 100 companies listed on the ASX. They tend to be large household names such as NAB, Woolworths or Harvey Norman. Currently the smallest large-cap company – measured by market capitalisation (shares outstanding multiplied by price) – is CSR with a market capitalisation of $2.1 billion which has been listed on the ASX since 1962. Conversely, companies classified as small caps are generally newer companies seeking to grow earnings by developing a new mine, product or technology. An example is Afterpay Touch that was first listed last June. Often small companies grow at such a rate that they become classified as large companies like A2M Milk. However, this also works in the other direction in the case of declining companies like Myer.

Life is harder for smaller companies

At first glance, one would think that smaller companies on average should underperform large companies, as company size confers stability and a range of advantages. In other words, small companies have limited financial resources and fewer avenues to access the capital markets. These characteristics entail commercial disadvantages, for example, Westpac can easily raise capital from a number of sources quickly, whereas a small company may only be able to tap existing shareholders. Additionally, small companies generally face a higher cost of debt with a shorter tenor, as only large companies are able to sell 10-year bonds to the US Private Placement market. Larger companies can therefore negotiate more forcefully over interest rates with the domestic banks.

Additionally, smaller companies often have weaker competitive advantages than many large Australian companies that operate in cosy domestic oligopolies, where the incentive is mainly to maximise profits by managing the political environment to maintain the status quo. Arguably however the competitive advantages conferred by operating in domestic oligopolies can lead to destructive offshore acquisitions designed to deliver growth that may be elusive domestically, where the company is constrained by regulation or the actions of competitors protecting their market share. A recent example of this can be seen in Wesfarmers’ hardware acquisition in the UK and BHP’s foray into US shale gas.

Small companies outperform

Despite these challenges, since the 1980s a number of studies have shown that small-cap equities have historically outperformed large-cap equities on a risk-adjusted basis over the longer term. The most famous study of this phenomenon was done by Nobel laureates Fama and French[1] who looked at monthly returns between July 1926 and February 2012 in the US stock market. They found that during that time, small-cap stocks also delivered a cumulative excess return of 253% relative to large-company stocks. In their view, the outperformance of small caps over large caps was due to an element of risk unique to small companies; that is, investors are compensated for undertaking additional risk inherent to investing in companies with higher risk

As a former small-cap fund manager, my observation is that some of this outperformance can also be attributed to market inefficiency and not just compensation for additional risk. Inevitably smaller companies are less well understood by the overall market. They will be less subject to analyst coverage from the investment banks, which could increase the risk of mispricing. For example, there are 16 analysts working at large investment banks publishing research on BHP, all seeking to uncover new information or angles on this company currently worth $112 billion. Conversely, most small companies struggle to receive minimal – if any – coverage from stockbrokers.

The last twelve months in Australia

Over the last twelve months, small capitalisation companies listed on the ASX have outperformed their larger cousins by close to 10% on average, a significant gap. The largest 100 companies on the ASX have returned 13% including dividends, a pretty good return by historical standards. However, amongst these companies there is a significant variance in returns.

Amongst the large caps the top performing companies were CSL (56%), Santos (+88%), ResMed (+59%), and Macquarie (+48%), ably assisted by mining heavyweights BHP (+39%) and Rio (+25%).  Whilst these are all great returns for investors the average return has been dragged down by Telstra (-26%), AMP (-29%), and Fortescue (-19%) as well as fallen angels Ramsay (-18%) and Harvey Norman (-15%). However, the real story behind the underperformance of large capitalisation stocks is the banking sector that has essentially done nothing over the past year: Westpac (-2%), NAB (0%), ANZ (+3%) and CBA (-7%). These four stocks represent close to a quarter of the ASX – though if we measured this four weeks ago the results would have been worse!

Whilst the returns over the last year from large companies such as CSL and Santos were impressive, they look quite pedestrian when compared with the star small-cap companies such as Afterpay Touch (+361%), Beach Energy (+186%), Appen (+161%), WiseTech Global (+113%), and A2M milk (+130%). The common theme amongst these is investors paying for early-stage IT or growth companies that benefit from leveraging exciting technologies or are M&A candidates for bigger companies.

The small cap index also has a large weighting to mining services and small mining companies that were on their knees in early 2016 but given their operating leverage have benefited from rising commodity prices in 2017 and 2018 courtesy of a Chinese stimulus plan. Still, investing in small companies is not without risks, as when things go wrong for a smaller company often the consequences are more extreme than for a larger more established company. Over the past year Retail Food Group (-89%), BlueSky (-74%), Isentia (-55%) and Myer (-32%) have caused a degree of pain for small cap investors, as well as former market darlings Ainsworth Game Tech (-53%), Vocus (-29%), Class Super (-26%) and Amaysim (-41%).

The last ten years

Over the past 10 years the large caps have actually outperformed the small caps by 30%, however we recognise that a big factor in this performance is related to the time frame used. As you can see from the below chart, the market crash during the GFC hit the smaller companies much harder than their larger cousins, with the small companies falling on average -48% in 2008 compared with the still very painful -29% fall for the Top 100 companies. When the economy falters, smaller companies have a greater risk of going into administration. Given the number of small companies listed on the ASX exposed to mining or mining services, share price falls are magnified when the downturn in the economy is accompanied by a fall in commodity prices as it was in 2008.

Additionally, after a recovery in 2009, the above chart shows that the small capitalisation index was unchanged until early 2017. Over this same period the large caps did well, particularly in the period 2012 -2015. This occurred as the large cap financials benefited from the removal of competition and falling rates globally, whilst the mining stocks bounced back courtesy of higher commodity prices from a range of Chinese stimulus plans.

[1] Fama, Eugene F & French, Kenneth R, 1992. ” The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns,” Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(2), pages 427-465, June.

 

Our Take

Since March 2009, the ASX has risen close to 60% and in our opinion, there is a range of companies on the ASX that are priced on the assumption that benign conditions will continue indefinitely. Towards the latter stages of any sustained bull market in equities, it is prudent for investors to have a close look at what they have in their portfolio. We would be disinclined to own small cap companies that rely on benign debt and equity markets to finance their growth or are “concept stocks” still proving up their business model. Whilst many of the larger companies might not have the “blue sky” growth prospects of some of the stellar small caps of the past year mentioned above, they do however have business models that have been tested during trying market conditions. With the ASX small companies index trading on 21x forward earnings one could think that you are paying quite a lot for this growth with a minimal margin of safety.

Keeping the Dividends Flowing

We look at the question of dividend sustainability very closely when constructing the Atlas Core Australian Equity Portfolio. One of the main factors in building the portfolio is identifying companies that can deliver consistent distributions that are growing ahead of inflation, whilst actively avoiding companies with distribution risk. Aside from wanting a consistent yield for our investors, as we have seen with Telstra over the past few years, high current distributions do not compensate investors for the capital fall that occurs when the dividend is cut. Indeed we often see that a small dividend cut has an over-sized impact on the company’s share price.

In investing terms, buying companies that have a chance of cutting their dividend this is a bit like picking up pennies in front of a moving steamroller, you may snatch a few coins but eventually your arm will get crushed by the roller! In this week’s piece we are going to look at dividend sustainability.

 

 

Key indicators for dividend sustainability

The dividend payout ratio divides the dividend by the earnings per share and this is something that we look at closely to gauge if a company can both maintain and grow its dividends. When a company paying out 90 to 100% of its earnings faces a small change in profitability, it will have to cut its dividend, whereas a company with a payout ratio of say 50% not only can handle the inevitable changes in market conditions, but also has the scope to increase dividends without an increase in company profits. With some companies such as Transurban, for accounting reasons, you will want to use free cash flow instead of earnings, which are impacted by accounting items such as a high depreciation charge.  Over a number of years up until 2018 Telstra maintained a dividend around 30 cents per share, however this was achieved via paying out all of its earnings in dividends and indeed in some years the company was borrowing to pay the dividend. A position that was clearly unsustainable in the long term.

Leverage is another factor that we look at when evaluating whether a company can sustain and grow their dividend. Here we are looking both at standard ratios such as debt to equity and interest coverage; as well as when the debt is due. Whilst leverage magnifies returns to equity (and thus dividends) when times are good, when conditions deteriorate and the heavily indebted company’s bankers come hammering at the door, cutting the dividend is inevitably their first action. For example, in 2015 rising debt levels forced grocery wholesaler Metcash to cancel the dividend for a number of years in an effort to reduce gearing.

Finally, we look at earnings and cash flow growth, as if a company is not growing earnings it is obviously not in a position to increase dividends and this may be the sign that the company operates in a stagnant or declining industry. Ultimately investors buy shares in a company in the anticipation of receiving a stream of earnings that will grow ahead of inflation. If dividends are static, then their real value (i.e. value after deducting inflation) declines annually. One of the reasons why we like toll road company Transurban is because the revenue they receive from road tolls automatically grows each year which feeds into rising dividends. For example,  the tolls on the M2 motorway in Sydney increase quarterly by the greater of quarterly CPI or 1%; in effect a 4% annual increase.

Amcor ticks many of the boxes

Amcor is a company that we own in the Australian Equity portfolio offering a solid 4.6% yield that ticks all of these boxes. Amcor has a dividend payout ratio is 70% with an extensive history of providing growing dividends. The company has an interest cover of 7.5 times and net debt divided by earning of 2.9 times, which indicates that the company does not face any imminent balance sheet stress.

Continued growth in in flexibles packaging in the US and Europe as well as the developing markets for this market leader will allow Amcor to continue to grow the dividend for shareholders.  Additionally, further weakness in the AUD will boost profits for Australian investors, as the packaging company generates all of its earnings outside Australia.

What about Telstra and its 8% yield?

Whilst we are looking at Telstra as at some stage it may represent good value, it still looks too early despite the company currently offering a 8% fully franked yield.  Telstra 2022 will be a complicated process with high execution risk and Telstra as a company has a poor long-term record of executing on complex projects. Historically companies have struggled to successfully make significant changes to their business without slipping up whilst their core offering is under pressure. Additionally, Telstra attracts a higher degree of political scrutiny than most firms face which may hamper their ability to reduce their headcount by the planned 8,000 staff members.

In 2018, Telstra is expected to pay a dividend of 22 cents per share but falling earnings from increased competition and restructuring charges may necessitate further cuts in 2019. Additionally, from 2020, NBN payments which are being used to support the dividend begin to taper off. Given this environment, we see that there are other companies that will offer safer and more stable returns for investors seeking income from Australian equities

Our Take

Despite our focus on delivering high fully franked distributions we have avoided some high dividend payers such as Telstra, as our investment process focuses on dividend sustainability and precludes investing in companies that may pay a high current dividend, but have a probability that this will be reduced in the medium term. One of the lessons that that we consistently observe is that when a company cuts its dividend (often for the right reasons) their share price frequently gets punished excessively by vengeful yield investors. Here the several years of high dividends is normally outweighed by the heavy decline in the dividend-cutting company’s share price.

Monthly Newsletter June 2018

  • In June, the Fund gained +1.4% which makes for an 8% return for the quarter. This is ahead of expectations given the Fund’s lower risk portfolio and high cash weight.
  • After having a weak start to 2018 due to concerns about rapidly rising interest rates and the impact of Amazon, the listed property sector continued to rebound in June due to increased corporate activity in the sector. Additionally, domestic retailers should see a benefit from 1 July 2018 onwards as GST will now be applied to all imported goods.
  • The Fund has increased its distribution for the June quarter and has been active in reducing risk over the last month.

 

Go to Monthly Newsletters for a more detailed discussion of the listed property market and the fund’s strategy going into 2018.

AFR:Commonwealth Bank’s CFS planning, broking arms ‘basically up for sale’

Commonwealth Bank investors have questioned the pairing of high-value funds management operations with risky advice and mortgage broking units, but have more broadly welcomed the split of $8 billion worth of wealth businesses into a separate company.

Hugh Dive, founder and chief investment officer of Atlas Funds Management, said he “wouldn’t be surprised” to see CFS Group spin off the financial planning and mortgage broking units before the demerger.

“Whilst Colonial, the funds management business and the platforms, are very good, people will discount the value of the financial planning business,” he said.

“Financial planning is not a great business to be in. Your assets walk out the door every day … the clients have a great relationship with the planner, not with the funds management house.”

Mr Dive, however, said the chances of capital return as a result of an IPO “struck me as a very low probability outcome”.

“That was a supposed disappointment, but we didn’t factor that [capital relief] as a factor at all,” he said.

Commonwealth Bank’s CFS planning, broking arms ‘basically up for sale’

Commonwealth Bank investors have questioned the pairing of high-value funds management operations with risky advice and mortgage broking units, but have more broadly welcomed the split of $8 billion worth of wealth businesses into a separate company.