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Monthly Newsletter December 2017

  • The Fund posted a gain of +0.6% over the last month of 2017, ahead of the underlying ASX 200 A-REIT index. December was dominated by the news of the potential takeover of Westfield by Unibail-Rodamco. Outside of Westfield, the overall performance of the index was weak.
  • The Fund remains positioned towards Trusts that offer recurring earnings streams from rental income rather than development profits, we see that this is likely to position us well going into 2018, as the property development market cools.
  • In December the Fund paid a distribution of $0.05; an increase of +2.9% over the September quarter distribution.

 

Go to  Monthly Newsletters for a more detailed discussion of the listed property market in December and the fund’s strategy going into 2018.

Dogs of the ASX …. Woof Woof!

The “Dogs of the Dow” is an investment strategy that is based on buying the ten worst performing stocks over the past 12 months from the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) at the beginning of the year, but restricting the stocks selected to those that are still paying a dividend. The thought process behind requiring a company to pay a dividend  is that if it is still paying a distribution, its business model is unlikely to be permanently broken. The strategy then holds these ten stocks over the calendar year and sells them stocks at the end of December. The process then restarts, buying the ten worst performers from the year that has just finished. In this area retail investors can have an advantage over institutional investors, many of whom sell the “dogs” in their portfolio towards the end of the year as part of “window dressing” their portfolio. This avoids the manager having to explain to asset consultants why these unloved stocks are still in their portfolios.

In this week’s piece written from snowy Norway,  we are going to look at the “dogs” of the ASX, focusing on large capitalisation Australian companies with falling share prices. Additionally, we are going to sift through the trash of 2017 to try to discern any fallen angels with potential to outperform in 2018.   Unloved mutts
The Dogs of the Dow was made famous by O’Higgins in his 1991 book “Beating the Dow” and seeks to invest in the same manner as deep value and contrarian investors do. Namely, invest in companies that are currently being ignored or even hated by the market; but because they are included in a large capitalisation index like the DJIA or ASX 100, these companies are unlikely to be permanently broken. They may have the financial strength or understanding capital providers (shareholders and banks) that can provide additional capital to allow the company to recover over time.

ASX Dogs over the past five years
The table below looks at both the top and bottom performers for the past five calendar years and their performance over the subsequent 12 months. As always this is measured on a total return basis, which looks at the capital gain or loss after adding in dividends received.  Whilst sifting through the trash at the end of the year yields the occasional gem – such as Qantas in 2017 (+65%), Fortescue in 2016 (+223%), Qantas again in 2014 and Challenger in 2012 (+81%) – an equal weighted portfolio of the dogs of the ASX 100 has outperformed the index in three of the past seven years.

 

Themes
Looking at the above table, finding the fallen angel among the worst performers seems to work best where the underperformance is due to stock-specific issues, rather than macro issues beyond a company’s control. For example, Cochlear underperformed in 2013 after weaker sales as the company waited for approval to sell its new Nucleus 6 product in the United States. Subsequently, Cochlear’s share price has gained 240%,  as hearing implant sales bounced back. Similarly BlueScope Steel had a tough 2015, which saw the company seeking government support to help restructure their Port Kemba steelworks. Concurrently, cheap Chinese steel took market share at the same time as key inputs of iron ore and metallurgical coal were climbing upwards. 2016 saw a significant turnaround for BlueScope’s shares which gained +111% as profits recovered due to cost controls, stronger sales and the benefits of an acquisition in the United States.

The common factor among the underperformers that have continued their slide in the following year is when the underperformance is tied to factors outside the company’s control, such as a multi-year decline in a commodity. From the list of underperformers in 2014, continuing declines in iron ore delivered further pain to Arrium, Fortescue and BHP’s shareholders. Similarly, a several year slide in oil prices pushed down the share prices of Santos and Worley in the subsequent 12 months.

Unloved hounds as of December 2017
As a fund manager the key question is whether there are potential show champions in the breed of unloved canines tabled below for the 2017 calendar year. Unlike previous years a diverse mix of sectors are represented and there are more company-specific reasons for underperformance, which should yield more opportunities to pick some treasure out of the trash.

Looking at the two telcos Vocus and Telstra, it is tough to see the near term catalysts that will transform them into stars in 2018, with the NBN market likely to remain intensely competitive with high costs to migrate customers. Fortescue is likely to continue to face Chinese preference for higher grade iron ore over its lower-grade blends to improve furnace efficiency and reduce pollution. Domino’s Pizza could be a candidate for a turn-around in 2018, now the company is more reasonably valued with multiple avenues for growth across its discount pizza operations in Europe, Australia and Japan and a falling AUD will boost earnings. Similarly Brambles could see a brighter 2018 based on growth in US pallets, management stability and a falling AUD.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Our View
Whilst the Dogs of the Dow might work in a market populated with a diversified range of companies in uncorrelated industries such as McDonalds, 3M, Merck and Microsoft, it does not appear to be a broad strategy that one can use consistently in the ASX. We see that among the companies in the ASX 100, the composition of the index is not as broad as the Dow at an industry level. The ASX has a high weighting to resource companies, whose profitability is largely tied to commodity prices (such as oil and iron ore) that are outside of management’s control and can be subject to multi-year declines.

Nevertheless it can pay to sort though the dogs of the ASX. From the table above over the past 5 years, one of the top performers in the following year can be found by sifting through the dogs of the ASX100.

 

 

Croquettes and Duck Confit for Westfield

This morning European property company Unibail-Rodamco announced that it had entered into an agreement to acquire Westfield (WFD) to create a global developer and operator of flagship shopping centres in the US, UK, the Netherland and France. This deal values WFD at A$33 billion, or at a price earning multiple of over 22 times future earnings, what appears to be a full price.

Westfield is the largest holding in the Atlas High Income Property Fund, so we were understandably quite pleased with this development. In this note we are going to look at what will likely be the largest takeover in Australian corporate history.

Today’s deal marks the end of an era for Westfield, which was originally listed on the ASX the middle of the 1960-61 recession when unemployment spiked to a post-war high of 3.1%. The above image is from 1959 and is of Westfield’s first shopping centre in Blacktown.

Westfield Development Corp’s initial public offering offered 300,000 shares at five shillings! In recent years, the various corporate changes at Westfield have appeared to be movements of the chess pieces on the Westfield board leading towards this day. Moves such as the separation of the Australian assets (Scentre: SCG) from WFD’s global assets, seemed to be designed to increase the attractiveness of Westfield to a foreign suitor such as Unibail-Rodamco, and allow the Lowy family to exit the company first listed close to sixty years ago. For a deeper dive into the corporate gymnastics that Westfield has engaged in over the years look at our piece Westfield: the Thimble and the Pea.

The Deal
Under the agreement WFD holders will receive a combination of cash (US$2.67) and 0.01844 Unibail-Rodamco shares for every WFD unit owned. This equates to A$10.01 or a 18% premium to the price at the close of trading prior to the deal being announced. It is anticipated that the combined entity will have a primary listing in Paris and Amsterdam, with a secondary listing on the ASX.

Investors in the new combined entity will own a property trust with 104 shopping centres across Europe and the US valued at A$95 billion.

A higher bid?
In our opinion this deal is likely to go ahead with a minimal chance of competing bids, as the Franco-Dutch Unibail-Rodamco revealed that they already own 4.9% of WFD and that the Lowy family which own 9.5% of WFD are supporting the deal. Digging into the detail in the documents, there is also a US$150 million break fee that must be paid to the other party if either Unibail-Rodamco or Westfield were to decide to walk away from this deal.  The details on when this deal is likely to be completed is yet to be fully announced, though the parties expect that this will be consummated around June 2018 if shareholders vote in favour.

Our Take

Looking ahead, this takeover is likely to provide a positive boost in the near term to the Australian Listed Property market, as it raises the prospect of further takeovers. In the medium term, investors that decide to cash in their Westfield holdings are likely to look to deploy some of the proceeds in other Australian Listed Property Trusts which will boost share prices in the next six months.

The Atlas High Income Trust are likely to take the money that the Europeans are offering and reinvest elsewhere, as typically these situations represent a transfer of wealth from the aquiror’s shareholders (Unibail-Rodamco) to those of the takeover target (Westfield). This occurs due to the premium required to consumate the deal ineviatably is higher than the synergies actually achieved.

 

 

Monthly Newsletter November 2017

  • The Fund posted a gain of +3.6% over the month of November, which was ahead of our expectations in an exceptionally strong month for the Australian Listed Property sector. The derivatives overlay which we use to both enhance income and protect capital will naturally cause performance to lag in very strongly performing months.
  • The Fund remains positioned towards Trusts that offer recurring earnings streams from rental income,  rather than development profits. After the McGrath profit warning in November (attributed to slowing off the plan apartment sales), we remain convinced that this strategy will outperform as the market gives a higher value to recurring earnings as development profits being to wane.

 

Go to  Monthly Newsletters for a more detailed discussion of the listed property market in November and the fund’s strategy going into 2018.

Earnings Chicanery Part Two

Last week in part one of Atlas’ surprisingly popular series on financial statement trickery – Earnings Chicanery, we looked at the three financial statements and some measures a company can take to “dress up” their financial results. In part two we are going to build on this and take a look at some warning signs that there may be problems with a company’s financial statements.

Red Flag 1: The statements don’t match

On results day most attention is focused upon a company’s profit and loss statement. In particular, analysts and commentators scrutinise whether the company has achieved the expected profit or earnings per share guidance, which was usually given at the last result. Whilst the profit and loss statement usually provides good guidance as to how the company has traded over the past six months, as discussed last week it is also the statement most open to manipulation and should be read in conjunction with the cash flow statement. It is a good idea to compare a company’s operating cash flow with its reported profits. If there is a big divergence, then the accounts should be examined carefully.

The red flag that we are looking for here is when a company’s cash flow statement and profit and loss statements are moving in different directions over an 18 month period, and where a company is showing growing profitability, but declining cash flows. In the below table from the 2015 accounts, Dick Smith Holdings reported income growing from $19 million to $38 million, yet operating cash flow fell from $52 million to -$4 million.  This suggests that the sales generating profits reported on the profit and loss statement were actually pushing the company towards administration.

Another recent example of this can be seen in Slater+Gordon. In the below table from their 2015 accounts, the company reported that 2015 financial year profits were up +6% to $84 million, yet their operating cash flow had deteriorated by -25% to $41 million. Here it appears that the company was overstating its profits through the accounting of its “legal work in progress”, and was overly aggressive in anticipating the expected cash generated through won cases. Whilst the company was able to deliver the earnings growth the market was expecting, in reality the declining incoming cash flows showed signs that it was actually a business in trouble.

However there are exceptions to the rule
The earnings on the profit and loss statement for some businesses can diverge from the cash flow statement. For example, a construction company such as Cimic (nee Leightons) or Downer might not physically be paid until July in the next financial year for work done on a railway project. Here the profits at a point in time may be greater than the cashflows, though the lumpiness of the cash flows received from large individual contracts will even out over time.

Red Flag 2: A company has consistent extraordinary
Extraordinary items are gains or losses included on a company’s income statement from unusual or infrequent events. Importantly, they are excluded from a company’s operating earnings. These items are excluded from earnings to give investors a more “normalised” view of how the company has performed over the period. For example, if an industrial company such as Amcor books a $50 million gain from selling excess industrial land, including this profit would obscure information about how the company’s packaging businesses have performed over the past six months.

While reporting extraordinary items can be valid and useful, investors should be wary or make their own adjustments to company earnings where a company has frequent (and almost always negative) extraordinary items that they are seeking to exclude from their reported profits.

As a long-term observer of the Australian banks, almost every year they put through a write-off of software below the profit line. In my view, investing in banking software is a core part of their business model and it seems curious that the institution is willing to take the productivity benefits in their normalised earnings whilst ignoring a portion of the costs needed to achieve these gains.

Red Flag 3: Divergence from comparable companies
The warning sign we are looking for here is when a company consistently has higher average profitability, revenue growth or better working capital management than their industry peers. Invariably when management is asked they will give an answer that relates to management brilliance or superior controls, but realistically mature companies operating in the same industry tend to exhibit very similar characteristics. As such, their financial statements should to some extent correspond to the statements of companies operating in the same industry. For example, supermarkets such as Woolworths should have a similar cash conversion profile to Coles (operating cash flow divided by operating profits) and not dissimilar profit margins as they are selling identical products to largely the same set of customers.

Hollow Logs?
Occasionally management teams may be incentivised to under-report profits in any current period. This generally occurs when a company is under heightened union scrutiny due to wage negotiations with their employees, excessive government attention from perceived excessive profits, or expects a problem in the next year and wants to smooth their profits. For example, in the current environment of extremely low bad debts a bank could be incentivised to boost their bad debt provisions aggressively. This action would reduce current period profits, potentially a politically astute move when politicians are calling for a Royal Commission into Australia’s banking sector. These excess provisions, if not required, could then be written back at a later date to boost future profits.

Our Take

Earnings misrepresentation is difficult for investors to detect from the publicly available accounts, but when revealed can sometimes have extreme results for a company’s share prices. In my experience this is more an art than a science, as the investor gets a sense that something is not right with the accounts, rather than definitive proof of earnings manipulation. Normally actual manipulation generally only becomes obvious ex post facto, after management has been removed or a company goes into administration.